Recent Developments: Unconstitutional Sex-Based Mortality Tables by Farley, Robert J.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 15
Number 1 Fall, 1984 Article 3
1984
Recent Developments: Unconstitutional Sex-Based
Mortality Tables
Robert J. Farley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farley, Robert J. (1984) "Recent Developments: Unconstitutional Sex-Based Mortality Tables," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol.
15 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol15/iss1/3
Recent Developments 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEX-
BASED MORTALITY TABLES 
I n Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Compen-sation Plans 4.1. Nathalie Norris 
_U.S.-. 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d. 
1236 (1983), the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that an employer 
may not offer its employees' life annuity 
plans from private insurance companies 
that use sex-based actuarial mortality 
tables. To allow employers to do so, the 
Court found, would in effect permit the 
practice of discrimination on the basis of 
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.c. §§ 2000 et seq., which makes it 
unlawful employment practice "to dis-
criminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin." 
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1964). 
I. 
Since 1974, Arizona's Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity 
and Deferred Compensation plans has 
administered a deferred compensation 
plan whereby it has selected several 
insurance companies to participate in 
the "Plan" and, in turn, has offered its 
employees to enroll in the plan. When 
an employee chooses to participate in 
Arizona's plan, he must designate one of 
the participating companies chosen by 
Arizona in which he wishes to invest his 
deferred wages. Once the employee so 
designates and decides the amount of 
compensation to be deferred each 
month, Arizona is responsible for 
withholding the appropriate sums from 
the employee's wages and directing 
those sums to the appropriate company. 
Insurance companies generally base 
the amount of monthly retirement 
benefits due a retired employee on: 1) 
the amount of compensation the em-
ployee defers; 2) the employee's age 
at retirement; and 3) the employee's sex. 
All the companies chosen by Arizona to 
participate in the plan employ sex-based 
mortality tables to calculate benefit 
amounts. The tables award a man larger 
monthly payments than a woman who 
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deferred the same amount of compensa-
tion and retired at the same age. 
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie 
Norris, an employee of the Arizona 
Department of Economic Security, 
elected to participate in Arizona's plan, 
and invested her deferred compensation 
in Lincoln National Insurance Com-
pany's fixed annuity contract. Norris, 
103 S.Ct. at 3495. 
On April 25, 1978, Norris brought 
suit against the state, the governing 
committee and several of its members, 
alleging that the plan discriminates on 
the basis of sex. 
II. 
The Court's opinion first probed the 
question of whether the defendants 
would have violated Title VII had they 
conducted the entire plan themselves, 
without the participation of any insur-
ance companies. The Court found 
direction in its opinion in Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power 4.1. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which 
was apparently the first challenge to 
contribution differences based on valid 
actuarial tables since the enactment of 
Title VII in 1974. In Manhart, the Court 
held that an employer had violated the 
statute by requiring its female employees 
to make larger contributions to a 
pension fund than male employees in 
order to obtain the same monthly 
benefits upon retirement. The Court 
found that the pension fund treated each 
woman "in a manner but for (her) sex 
would (have been) different." 435 U.S. 
at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, 
Employment Discrimination and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of I964, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971). 
Applying the "but for" standard 
illustrated in Manhart, the Court in 
Norris wholly rejected the defendants' 
contention that the Arizona plan does 
not discriminate on the basis of sex 
because a man and a woman who defer 
the same amount of compensation will 
obtain upon retirement policies having 
approximately the same present actuarial 
value. The Court found no difficulty in 
holding that the "classification of 
employees on the basis of sex is no more 
permissible at the pay-out stage of a 
retirement plan than at the pay-in 
stage." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497. It 
further noted that the defendants' 
assumption that sex may be properly 
used to predict longevity is inconsistent 
with the lesson of Manhart: that Title 
VII requires employers to treat their 
employees as individuals, not " 'as 
simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual, or national class.'" Norris, 103 
S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435 
U.S. at 708 (emphasis by Court). 
Thus, the majority opinion established 
that "it is just as much discrimination 
'because of... sex' to pay a woman lower 
benefits when she has made the same 
contributions as a man as it is to make 
her pay larger contributions to obtain 
the same benefits." Id. at 3499. 
continued on page 14 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
COPYRIGHTABILITY 
I n Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the denial of Apple's motion 
for preliminary injunction seeking to 
restrain Franklin from infringing copy-
rights on 14 of its software programs. 
The unanimous three-judge panel ruled 
that copyright protection does extend to 
operating programs. 
Franklin manufactures and sells the 
Ace 100 personal computer designed to 
be "Apple compatible" so that peri-
pheral equipment and software designed 
for the Apple II could be used in 
conjunction with the Ace 100. In order 
to achieve this compatibility, Franklin 
admittedly copied 14 of Apple's opera-
ting system programs (the instructions 
which tell the computer which functions 
to perform). Operating programs can be 
stored on a variety of memory devices 
such as semi-conductor "micro-chips," 
which are connected to the circuitry, 
and "floppy disks" (flexible magnetic 
disks similar to phonograph records). 
These programs are referred to as 
software, whereas the machinery of the 
computer is known as hardware. 
Franklin explained that designing its 
own programs would be impractical and 
would not ensure 100% compatibility 
because "there were just too many entry 
CASE COMMENT: Pouncey v. 
State-Guilty and Insane 
I n Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in 
a criminal case could be found both 
guilty of a crime and insane at the time of 
its commission. In so holding, the Court 
determined that an insanity verdiet does 
not necessarily defeat the element of 
criminal intent. 
To reach a verdiet of guilty, the de-
mands of due process require that the 
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant engaged in a 
prohibited act (actus reus) and that the 
defendant possessed the criminal intent 
(mens rea) to commit such an act. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see 
generally, R. Perkins and R. Boyce, 
Criminal Law 78-81 (3rd ed. 1982). T ra-
ditionally, a finding of insanity during 
the commission of a crime would prevent 
the rendering of a guilty verdiet because 
it was deemed that the defendant, in being 
insane, was incapable of forming the re-
quired criminal intent. See Bethea v. 
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 n.15 
(D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 
911 (1976). 
In Pouncey, the defendant was charged 
with the first degree murder of her five 
year old son. She pleaded not guilty and 
interposed the defense of insanity. The 
evidence disclosed that the defendant 
believed her son was pursued by the devil 
and the only way to prevent her son from 
going to hell was to kill him. The evi-
dence further disclosed that the defen-
dant had drowned her son and that she 
was legally insane at the time the crime 
was committed. The trial court found 
the defendant guilty of first degree mur-
der and legally insane at the time of the 
offense. The defendant appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals, claiming that 
the verdiets of guilty and insane were 
mutually inconsistent and that she was 
entitled to a verdiet of not guilty. The 
Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior 
to a decision by the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
In Pouncey, the Court of Appeals stated 
that the insanity defense in Maryland was 
defined by statute and court rule. Pouncey 
v. State, 297 Md. at 266,465 A.2d at 476. 
The Court noted that the Health-General 
Code identifies the test for insanity and 
responsibility for criminal conduct and 
provides: 
A defendant is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if, at the time of 
that conduct, the defendant, be-
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cause of mental retardation or a 
mental disorder, lacks substantial 
capacity: 
( 1) 1'0 appreciate the criminality 
of that conduct; or 
(2) To conform that conduct to 
the requirements of law." 
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12-
107 (1982).1 
Having disclosed the statutory law, 
the Court noted that the verdict of guilty 
and insane was not without precedent in 
Maryland. Four years earlier, under a 
statute not different in substance from 
the criminal responsibility test set out 
above, the court in Langworthy v. State, 
284 Md. 588,399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1979), "held that 
a person found guilty of a crime charged, 
yet successful in asserting an insanity de-
fense, could appeal from the guilty ver-
diet." Id., as cited in Pouncey v. State, 297 
Md. at 266-267, 465 A.2d at 477. The 
court in Pouncey then concluded that, 
"necessary to that determination was a 
finding that a guilty verdiet is not incon-
sistent with a special verdiet of insanity." 
Id., 297 Md. at 267,465 A.2d at 477. 
Although the court in Langworthy was 
concerned with determining whether the 
verdiet of guilty and insane was a final 
judgment and thus appealable, it did not 
miss the opportunity to interpret the in-
sanity statute then in effect. Without 
pointing to any explicit legislative history 
directed to the statute, the court in lang-
worthy reasoned that since the Court of 
Special Appeals had previously deter-
mined that the demands of due process 
require a defendant be provided the op-
portunity to prove his innocence even 
though the prosecution has accepted the 
defendant's insanity plea, then the statu-
tory scheme for insanity must contem-
plate that there first be a determination 
of guilt or innocence followed by a deter-
mination of insanity. Langworthy v. State, 
284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584; see also 
case comment, A Defendant Found Guilty 
But Insane May Appeal His Conviction: 
continued on page 26 
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III. 
Concluding that Title VII would have 
been violated had the defendants run the 
entire deferred compensation plan 
themselves, without participation by 
insurance companies, the Court then 
focused attention on the issue of 
whether a Title VII violation has been 
committed, given the fact it was the 
insurance companies chosen by Arizona 
to participate in the plan that calculated 
and paid the retirement benefits. 
The Court, for purposes of resolving 
the issue, found it necessary to define 
the limits of Title VII violations. In so 
doing, the Court again finding strength 
from its opinion in Manhart, found that 
Title VII "primarily govern(s) relations 
between employees and their employer, 
not between employees and third 
parties." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3499, 
quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718, n. 
33. However, the Court in Manhart was 
quick to point out that despite said 
"relations" such a limitation would not 
disallow an employer to set aside equal 
retirement contributions for each em-
ployee and let each, upon retirement, 
purchase benefits in the open market. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnote 
omitted). 
The defendants seized this language 
and argued they did not violate Title VII 
because the annuity plans offered by the 
companies participating in the Arizona 
plan reflect those available in the open 
market. Unfortunately, no relevance or 
substance was found in this defense by 
the Court; rather, it found that Arizona 
did not simply set aside retirement 
benefits and allow employees to purchase 
annuities in the open market, but created 
a plan whereby employees could ob-
tain an annuity only if they invested 
in a company specifically chosen by 
Arizona. In essence, by requiring 
employees to choose from companies 
selected only by the state, Arizona 
became a party to each annuity contract 
entered into by one of its employees. 
The Court then reiterated the well 
established rule, that "both parties to a 
discriminatory contract are liable for 
any discriminatory provisions the con-
tract contains, regardless of whieh party 
initially suggested inclusion of the 
discriminatory provisions." Norris, 103 
S.Ct. at 3501-02, See Williams v. New 
Orleans Steamship Ass'n., 673 F.2d 742, 
750-51 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
_U.S._ (1983). 
continued on page 24 
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IV. 
One of the main purposes of Title VII 
is to "make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination." Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 
( 1975). Moody illustrated the existence 
of a strong presumption in favor of 
retroactive relief for Title VII violations, 
and Manhart stressed that the presump-
tion was one that could seldom be 
overcome. Upon examination of the 
relief afforded Norris by the district 
court below, which affected only those 
benefit payments made after the date of 
its judgment, the Supreme Court found 
that such an award was inconsistent with 
the presumption elicited in Moody and 
recognized in Manhart. 
Before remanding the issue to the 
district court, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the lower court give more 
attention to the fact that, before 
Manhart, the use of sex-based tables 
might reasonably have been assumed to 
be lawful. In addition, the Court noted 
that the decision in Manhart should have 
put the defendants on notice that a man 
and a woman who make the same 
contributions to a retirement plan must 
be paid the same monthly benefits. 
Therefore, the lower court should 
examine whether the defendants, after 
Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral 
tables to the pre-Manhart contributions 
made by the plaintiff, Norris, and a 
similarly situated male employee with-
out violating any contractual rights that 
the latter might have had on the basis of 
his pre-Manhart contributions. Norris, 
103 S.Ct. at 3503-04. If the defendants 
could have done this, they should have 
in order to prevent further discrimina-
tion, and it would therefore be equitable 
that defendants be required to supple-
ment any benefits coming due after the 
district court's judgment by whatever 
sum necessary to "make Norris whole." 
Id. 
V. 
Justice Powell, joined by three other 
justices, dissented as to the defendants' 
liability, basing his assertation on the 
premises that sex-based mortality tables 
reflect objective actuarial standards and 
employee classification on the basis of 
sex in reference to life expectancy is a 
"nonstigmatizing factor that demon-
strably differentiates females from males 
and that is not measurable on an 
individual basis .... " Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 
3509. 
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The dissent further warned that the 
potential effect of the majority's holding 
would be to: 1) deny employees the 
opportunity to purchase life annuities at 
lower costs because (a) the cost to 
employers of offering unisex annuities is 
prohibitive, or (b) insurance carriers 
would not choose to write such 
annuities; 2) inflict the heavy cost 
burden of equalizing benefits sustained 
by those insurance companies and 
employers choosing to offer such on 
current employees; and 3) have a 
disruptive impact on the operation of an 
employer's pension plan as an unfore-
seen contingency jeopardizing the in-
surer's solvency and the insured's 
benefits. Id. 
The potential effect of the majority's 
holding on insurance companies and 
employers has yet to be fully observed. 
Nonetheless, it is now clearly established 
that an employer or insurer can no 
longer fashion his personal policies on 
the basis of assumptions about the 
differences between men and women 
previously believed to be valid. W 
by Robert J. Farley 
Lack of Jury Impartiality 
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In 1919, the Judicial Code, § 269 (28 
U.S.c. § 391) espoused the principle 
that on any appeal, a court was to 
examine the trial record "without regard 
to technical errors, defects, or excep-
tions which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties." The essence of this 
provision was incorportaed in Rule 61 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This harmless error provision instructs 
the district courts that throughout a trial 
proceeding judges "must disregard any 
error which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." 
(emphasis added). Support for this 
principle can be found in De Santa v. 
Nehi Corp., 171 F.2d 696 (2d. Cir. 
1948), where the court held that it is 
considered best practice for appellate 
courts to act in accordance with the 
mandate of Rule 61. The principle of 
Rule 61 was ultimately codified by 
Congress to be specifically applied to 
appellate courts in 28 U.S.c. §2111 
(1949). 
In McDonough Power, the Supreme 
Court noted that a fair trial requires an 
impartial trier of fact-U[ a] jury capable 
and willing to decide the case solely on 
the evidence before it," Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) and that an 
important safeguard of jury impartiality 
is the voir dire examination. The court 
held that in order to uphold the due 
process requirement of impartiality, 
prospective jurors must answer honestly 
questions posed to them. 
With these principles in mind, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the varied 
responses given by prospective jurors in 
McDonough when the history of severe 
injuries question was posed. The range 
of responses indicated that each juror 
interpreted the question differently; 
some jurors' responses revealed injuries 
resulting from minor incidents while 
other jurors' responses failed to disclose 
injuries resulting from serious accidents. 
The court acknowledged that even 
though the jurors were mistaken by 
failing to disclose various injuries 
sustained by their family members, their 
responses were honest in light of their 
interpretation of the voir dire question. 
The Supreme Court held that the 
policy of judicial management, evidenced 
by the harmless error rules of disregard-
ing errors that do not interfere with the 
fairness of a trial, must be upheld 
because the importance of trial finality 
outweighs evidence of trial imperfection. 
To effect the policy behind the harmless 
error rules, the court adopted the 
following two-part test to evaluate the 
propriety of granting a motion for a new 
trial based on lack of information 
received from a juror on voir dire 
examinations: (1) "a party must first 
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir 
dire" and (2) "that a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause." _U.S. _,_. 
There are two concurring opinions in 
McDonough Power. Justice O'Connor 
concurred with the majority, holding 
that "honesty of a juror's response is the 
best initial indicator of whether the 
juror in fact was impartia1." _ U.S. 
-, _. However, Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence is written with the view that 
the ultimate determinations regarding 
the existence of juror bias and the need 
for a new trial remain within the trial 
court's discretion. 
In the second concurrence, Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, 
agreed with the majority's result but 
asserted a different test to evaluate the 
granting of a motion for a new trial based 
on lack of information by a juror on voir 
dire examination. Justice Brennan's test 
focuses on a juror's bias, not his 
honesty, and requires a party seeking a 
new trial to demonstrate that: (1) "the 
